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Abstract—IP prefix hijacking is known as one of the
top security threats targeting today’s Internet routing
infrastructure. Several schemes have been proposed to
either detect or mitigate prefix hijacking events. However,
none of these approaches is adopted and deployed in large-
scale on the Internet due to reasons such as scalability,
economical practicality, or unrealistic assumptions about
the collaborations among ISPs. As a result, there is lack of
actionable and deployable solutions for dealing with prefix
hijacking.
In this paper, we study key issues related to deploying
and operating an IP prefix hijacking detection and mit-
igation system. Our contributions include (i) deployment
strategies for hijacking detection and mitigation system
(named as TOWERDEFENSE ): a practical service model
for prefix hijacking protection and effective algorithms
for selecting agent locations for detecting and mitigating
prefix hijacking attacks; and (ii) large scale experiments
on PlanetLab and extensive analysis on the performance
of TOWERDEFENSE . We demonstrate that, by using only
a few agents, TOWERDEFENSE can detect and mitigate
prefix hijacking with up to 99.8% and 98.2% success ratios
respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
IP Prefix Hijacking attacks threaten the Internet’s
routing infrastructure. Fundamentally, the inherent as-
sumption of self-policing and trust among participants of
BGP [1], the inter-domain routing protocol responsible
for exchanging routing information among thousands
of Autonomous Systems (ASes) in order to route the
traffic globally, opens up the possibility for false route
announcements to infiltrate the routing infrastructure.
When conducting prefix hijacking, a malicious or mis-
configured BGP router (called hijacker or attacker)
either originates an AS path announcement for an IP
prefix not owned by the router’s AS or announces for
an IP prefix (called target prefix) an AS path con-
sisting of nonexistent links. Such false announcements
render the misbehaving router’s AS very attractive for
forwarding traffic towards the target IP prefix. Lacking
effective means to verify the accuracy and authenticity
of such route announcements, ASes that receive such
BGP updates may accept and propagate the false route,
as well as subsequently forward traffic destined to the
target prefix according to the false path. As a result,
affected data traffic is diverted, or “hijacked”, to ill-
intentioned locations, causing performance degradation,
service outage, and security breach for the victim prefix.
The importance of defending against IP prefix hi-
jacking is well recognized by both industry and re-
search communities, and many solutions [2]–[23] have
been proposed in order to prevent, detect, locate, or
mitigate IP prefix hijacking. However, the aforemen-
tioned solutions only solve parts of the problem and
a critical step is still missing towards an operational
deployment on the Internet. They either require changes
to current routing infrastructures (e.g., router software,
network operations), and/or public key infrastructures, or
are compatible with existing routing infrastructures but
lack of practical deployment strategies. Since changing
the routing infrastructure usually involve more efforts
and collaborations among ASes, we aim at making the
existing solution deployable by bridging the gap in the
need of practical deployment strategies. In particular,
we believe the following two key issues need to be
addressed in an operational deployment of any existing
scheme on the Internet: (i) who should deploy and
operate a system that can detect and mitigate hijacking
attacks, and (ii) how to deploy the such kind of system
(e.g., how to strategically place agents for detection and
mitigation of hijacking attacks). Instead of proposing
yet another new detection and mitigation scheme, this
paper systematically examines these issues and propose
two practical deployment strategies that can be used
together with existing detection and mitigation schemes
for battling against prefix hijacking attacks.
Our first deployment strategy is a new service model
in which the service providers in particular the ISPs
and CDN providers can deploy and operate a prefix
hijacking detection and mitigation system for protecting
their customers, due to the following reasons. First of all,
the service provides do have strong incentive to operate
such a detection and mitigation system. Discussions with
the ISP operators indicate that customers often blame
their providers if their traffic are hijacked. Hence a direct
result of a customer’s prefix being hijacked is that its
service provider’s reputation and even revenue are in
jeopardy. Second, a service provider usually has more
resources than any of its customers for operating such
a system. It is also possible that the service providers
offer hijacking protection as an enhanced service for
their customers. On the other hand, customers often trust
their providers much more than any other third party for
battling against hijacking attacks since they are already
buying transit service from their providers.
Our second deployment strategy includes two prin-
ciples for agent placement based on existing prefix
hijacking defense mechanisms. Detection principle: to
effectively detect a particular prefix hijacking attack,
the detection system needs to have agents deployed in
the region within which the routers are “polluted” with
false route entries injected by the attack. This is because
only routing information that these agents gather, from
either control or data plane or both, may contain attacker
altered routes, the critical information any detection
mechanism depends upon. Mitigation principle: to ef-
fectively mitigate a hijack, traffic to target prefix can
be detoured towards pre-deployed relaying agents in
order to avoid the polluted region of an prefix hijacking
attack. For a given hijacking event, the “polluted” region
highly depends on the topological and routing policies
used on the Internet as shown in [24] (We will discuss
the differences between our study and [24] in Section
4.1.1). While previous detection/mitigation proposals
often evaluated their approaches with Internet topology,
the agent selection problem has not been systematically
studied: given the locations of hijackers are not known
prior to the attacks, where to strategically deploy route
information gathering agents and relaying agents to
effectively detect and mitigate attacks. We show in the
paper that the agent location placement problem is NP,
and propose effective greedy algorithms for it.
We observe the problem of deploying and operating a
prefix hijacking protection system is similar to that of a
popular strategy computer game genre “Tower Defense”
[25], appearing in best-selling game titles such as Star-
Craft, Age of Empires, and WarCraft. In such a game,
a player needs to wisely choose the types, numbers,
and locations of its guard towers to deploy based on
the cost budget, tower capability, and possible enemy
movements in order to win the battle against enemy
offenses. Similarly, in the battle against prefix hijacking
attacks, one also need to decide how many agents of each
type are needed to detect and mitigate hijacking attacks
on a set of prefixes that are needed to be protected,
and where to deploy these agents to achieve desire
protection coverage under certain resource constrains.
This is why we name the aforementioned strategies
as TOWERDEFENSE and the system built by following
TOWERDEFENSE strategies as TOWERDEFENSE system.
For the same reason, the deployed agents are sometimes
called “towers” in this paper.
To evaluate performance of TOWERDEFENSE , we
conducted extensive analysis and large-scale experiments
on PlanetLab to show that on a topology like today’s
Internet by using only a small number (i.e. 6) of vantage
points (where agents were deployed), TOWERDEFENSE
if deployed by a service provide, can detect and mitigate
prefix hijacking targeted at its customers with up to
99.8% and 98.2% success ratios respectively.
To highlight the practicality of TOWERDEFENSE we
show through a case study of one Tier-1 ISP that (i)
high detection/mitigation ratios can be achieved also
through adding an even smaller number of new vantage
points (which a service provider can obtain by buying
transit from other ISPs) to the service provider’s existing
vantage point infrastructure, and (ii) even when 800
customers of the ISP sign up for the TOWERDEFENSE
service gradually, the number of vantage points remains
small (∼20).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives an overview of the TOWERDEFENSE strategies.
Section III presents the detailed methodology for vantage
point selections for detection and mitigation purpose.
Then we analyze the selection results based on extensive
simulations in Section IV. Section V evaluates the per-
formance of TOWERDEFENSE on Planetlab. Section VI




We believe that protection against prefix hijacking
is most suitable to be offered by service providers in
particular ISPs and CDN providers to their existing
customers.
Firstly, since the protection service is provided by an
entity that a customer is already buying other services
(e.g. communications, content hosting, etc) from, the
customer likely has more confidence and convenience
to subscribe from them than from any new third parties.
Secondly a major issue in deploying a new service
is cost. In this aspect, service providers are positioned
far better than other potential parties because of their
existing infrastructures. A CDN service provider may
have already deployed its servers at a large number of
locations ranging from dozens to thousands of ASes.
All these locations can potentially be used as vantage
points for prefix hijacking protection. For ISPs, firstly, a
large ISP (e.g. tier-1 ISPs) may already own a few ASes
spanning large geological area; secondly, an ISP is aware
of the routes used by its neighboring ASes because its
border routers have established BGP sessions with the
neighbors; and thirdly, if the identified vantage point
location (say AS T ) is far away, an ISP can make up
the capability simply purchasing a connectivity from AS
T as a BGP customer and connect its prefix hijacking
protection equipments with the border router which runs
BGP session with AS T .
Moreover, although the service is offered for pro-
tecting customers of the service provider, in fact what
gets protected are the inbound traffic paths towards the
networks of these customers. If a hijacker can only hijack
traffic from regions that has very little traffic for the
target network, this hijacking is as good as non-effective.
Thus knowing who communicate with the protected
networks gives tremendous advantage for whoever offers
the protection. This is exactly where ISPs and CDN
providers have extensive knowledge.
B. Prefix Hijacking Protection
When a hijacker launches its hijacking attack against a
target network, using a BGP router in its AS the hijacker
spreads out false route announcements for the target
prefix. Upon receiving such route announcements, some
routers may accept the false routes and subsequently
propagate to their neighbor routers while others may
ignore such announcements. As a result, a portion of
the Internet is polluted by the false routes announced by
the hijacker. In the polluted region, routers now use the
hijacker’s false routes for forwarding packets addressed
for the target prefix. In other words, any traffic that
originates from or passes through the polluted region
are now “hijacked”.
Because typically only a portion of the Internet is
polluted, an attack can only be detected if there are
detection agents deployed in or right at the boundaries
of the polluted region so that they can gather informa-
tion regarding the false route for detecting anomalies.
Because the location and size of the polluted region
of an attack vary depending on the locations of both
the hijacker and target network, it is important to study
where to place such detection agents to achieve optimum
detection ratio for all possible hijacker locations.
Similarly, it is important to study where to deploy
agents that may assist in mitigating prefix hijacking
attacks. Different from mitigation approaches such as
[14] which are aiming at correcting the false routes,
we believe that a traffic redirection approach (e.g. IP
tunneling and DNS-based redirection [26], [27]) may
be more desirable because it can potentially react very
rapidly. Also this approach can be applied by a wider
range of providers, not only by those who are deeply
vested in BGP operations.
For mitigating a hijack, there can actually be two
types of redirections, which we refer to as reflecting
and mirroring. When a reflector r is used in mitigation
against a hijacking event on the target d, traffic from a
source s destined to d will be re-routed to r and then
from r to d. 1 On the other hand when a mirror m is
used in mitigation, traffic from s to d will be re-directed
to m, and m will function as a mirroring site of d and
respond to incoming traffic in the same way as d does.
An AS r can be used as a reflector site for s-d during a
hijacking event only if both the path from s to r and the
path from r to d are not polluted by the hijacking event.
In addition, because the hijacker may know who the
reflector r is, the path from s to r must not be polluted
by hijacking event launched by the same hijacker on r
either. On the other hand, the requirement for an AS
m being used as a mirror for mitigating hijacking event
on target d is that the path from s to m is not polluted
by the hijacking event on d and the path from s to m
is not polluted by the hijacking event on m. Although
the requirement for a mirror site is more relaxed than
reflector site, mirrors tend to be more expensive because
they need to replicate contents. In addition, mirrors are
better for less frequently changed contents.
Here again the key for a successful hijack mitigation
service is to place the mitigation agents, reflectors or
mirrors, at strategically important locations so that they
can mitigate the most attacks for the most sources of the
target network. Hence, in this paper we mainly focus on
placement strategy for detection and mitigation agents,
which we call towers.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the methodology for
a service provider to strategically select locations for
its detection towers and mitigation towers to defend
its customers against hijacking attacks. Because prefix
hijacking is targeting inter-domain routing infrastructure,
we consider ASes being the basic element. That is, we
refer to hijackers or towers as hijacker ASes or tower
ASes while it is understood that the actual hijacker or
tower is really one or more machines (e.g. BGP routers,
server, etc) within the corresponding AS.
Tower location selection involves evaluating many
imaginary hijacking scenarios in the Internet AS topol-
ogy, and assessing whether ASes may be impacted by
the attacks. A service provider can infer Internet AS
topology from publicly available BGP tables and updates
such as Route Views [28] and RIPE [29]. We leave the
discussion on the impact of the well-known topology
incompleteness to Section IV-D.
If an AS prefers a fake path to d announced by a
hijacker h over the AS’ current legitimate path to d, this
AS is impacted/polluted by the hijacking. Subsequently
not only will this AS propagate the fake path to its
neighbors, which in turn determine if they prefer the
fake path, any future traffic destined for d passing
1We assume that the reverse traffic path from d to s is not subject
to the same hijacking.
through the impacted AS is hijacked. In evaluating
hijacking scenarios, the selection algorithm determine
AS path preference based firstly on inter-domain routing
policies, then preferring shorter AS path, and finally
using random selection to break any remaining ties. Two
widely adopted inter-domain routing policies are “prefer
customer routes” and “valley-free routing” [30]. That is,
while forwarding traffic an AS always prefers to forward
using a link to its customer over a link to its peer over a
link to its provider. Moreover, after traversing a provider-
to-customer link or a peer link, a path will not traverse
another customer-to-provider link or another peer link.
A. Detection Tower Selection
TOWERDEFENSE can employ existing detection
mechanism [2], [16], [17], [19], [20], [31] for detecting
hijacking events. While the actual detection methods
differ by these approaches, they generally require the
presence of detection agents in impacted ASes. Thus
to keep our evaluation method general, we assume that
if the service provider has at least a detection tower
deployed in one of the impacted ASes, the hijacking
event can be detected.
Therefore the detection tower position selection prob-
lem can be formulated as the following. Given a cus-
tomer prefix d and a set of candidate detection tower
locations Vc, we need to find the minimum subset Vd
of Vc that the detection towers v in Vd can detect as
many as possible hijacking events targeting a customer
prefix d. If the candidate set contains all ASes on the
Internet, the problem does become a classic set cover
problem, which is NP hard. But in reality, the set of
candidate locations is limited thus the detection tower
selection. Therefore, to select the detection tower is at
least as hard as to solve the set cover. We adopt a greedy
algorithm similar to that for set cover problem to solve
this problem.
More specifically, the undetected hijacker AS set Hu
was first initialized to all possible hijacker ASes set
H for hijacking d and the selected detection tower set
Vd is empty. In each iteration, we select a detection
tower v from candidate set Vc that can detect the most
hijackers Hv from the undetected set Hu and move it
out of the candidate set Vc into the selected detection
tower set Vd. At the same time, we update the set of
undetected hijacker AS set Hu by taking out the hijacker
ASes that v can detect. The selection process can be
terminated either after a fixed number of detection towers
are selected (up to all candidate ASes) or after the gain in
the detection coverage by adding a new detection tower
becomes marginal (e.g., below a given threshold). More
formally, we define detection effectiveness DE(v, d) of
a detection tower v against hijackers attacking d as
DE(v, d) = |Hv|/|H| . Then the detection effectiveness





The above greedy algorithm is to maximize the detection
effectiveness.
B. Mitigation Tower Selection
Similar to detection tower selection, mitigation tower
selection is a variant of set cover and can be done by
a very similar greedy algorithm with one difference,
the criteria for picking one candidate mitigation tower
location over the others during each iteration. We first
define mitigation effectiveness of a mitigation tower






where S(h, d) is the set of d’s sources whose traffic
will be hijacked by h and MS(h,m, d)2 is the subset of
sources of S(h, d) that m can mitigate. Then we define
the mitigation effectiveness against a set of hijackers of





where H is the set of hijackers in question. Until now,
we defined the mitigation effectiveness of one vantage
point.
The mitigation tower selection algorithm, which tries
to maximize the mitigation effectiveness, is now de-
scribed as follows. Initially, the unmitigated hijacker
AS set H equals to all possible hijacker ASes for
hijacking d and the selected mitigation tower set Md
is empty. In each iteration, we select a mitigation tower
m from candidate set Mc that has the highest mitigation
effectiveness against hijackers in H and move it out of
the candidate set Mc into the selected mitigation tower
set Md. At the same time, we update the mitigation effec-
tiveness for each mitigation tower in remaining candidate
set Mc. The selection process can be terminated either
after a fixed number of mitigation towers selected or
after the gain in the mitigation coverage by adding a
new mitigation towers becomes marginal.
C. Remarks
The detection tower and mitigation tower selection
algorithms described above have implicitly assumed that
all ASes have equal probability hosting hijacker and all
sources are equally important. In reality, better knowl-
edge regarding both aspects may be available and the
2Although we do not explicit distinguish reflectors from mirrors
here, obviously in actual computation the MS(h, m, d) of an mitiga-
tion AS used as a reflector will be different from that of as a mirror.
algorithms can be enhanced accordingly by applying
different weighting factors, which are based on hijacker
hosting probability and source importance, for different
hijackers and sources when selecting the “best” candi-
date during each iteration.
IV. ANALYSIS RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of the
detection and mitigation selection methods proposed in
Section III, by exhaustively simulating hijacking events
on the AS level topology of the Internet with all possible
locations of hijacker ASes and target ASes.
A. AS Resilience
In our experiments, we construct the AS level topol-
ogy graph using BGP tables and routing updates ob-
tained from RouteViews and RIPE in 2008. The resulting
AS topology has over 28K ASes. 3 Using the method
proposed in [32], we classify them into five tiers. Stubs
are the lowest tier ASes with only customer-to-provider
links. There are 22856 stub ASes in total. On the other
hand, 9 well-known ISPs 4 with no providers are clas-
sified as Tier-1 ASes. The rest ASes are classified into
Tier-2, Tier-3, and Tier-4 based on their relationships
(e.g., provider, customer, or peer) to other ASes. The
number of Tier-2, Tier-3, Tier-4 ASes are 221, 2638,
3156 respectively.
Because AS relationship and AS path length are two
of the key factors in BGP best path selection process, the
impact of a hijacking event not only depends on locations
of the target AS and the hijacker AS in the Internet
topological hierarchy but also on the providers to which
the target AS connects. We use the metrics “resilience of
a target AS d” for quantitatively measuring the impact of
hijacking events targeted at d. Assuming that there is an
equal probability for where the hijacker may be on the
Internet, we hence define the resilience of a target AS d
as the average of the portions of unaffected-source-ASes
for all possible hijacker locations. 5
What is interesting about the resilience of a target AS
is that it has opposite significance for detection service
and mitigation service. For detection service, since only
detection towers which are polluted by a hijacking attack
will detect the hijacking event, the more resilient an
3Note that inferred AS topology can be incomplete due to limited
vantage points used in the data collection. We will show that missing
links in the AS topology has minor impact on the performance of our
detection and mitigation methods.
4Tier-1 ASes are AS1668 (AOL), AS7018 (AT&T), AS3549 (Global
Crossing), AS3356 (Level 3), AS2914 (NTT), AS209 (Qwest), AS1239
(Sprint), AS701(Verizon), and AS3561 (SAVVIS).
5In this paper we assume equal probability distribution of both
source and hijacker. The definition of resilience can easily be extended
to more complex model if more data regarding for a particular target
where its sources are distributed and the likelihood of having the
hijacker at different location.
AS is, the more difficult it is to find effective detection
tower locations. On the other hand, the more resilient
an AS is, the easier it is to find locations for mitigation
towers because an important qualification for being a
reflector/mirror location is that it is not hijackable by
the same hijacker attacking the target.
We now look at the resilience of the stub networks
which TOWERDEFENSE is aimed at protecting. We clas-
sify the stub networks based on the number of providers
a stub network has. In our Internet AS topology, there
are 22856 stubs in total, among which 12941 stubs
have a single provider, 3897 have two providers, 1387
have three providers, and 4631 have more than three
providers, respectively. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of the resilience of the stub ASes of each class. We can
see that the more providers a stub has, the more resilient
it likely is. This observation is consistent with that in
[24].
Different from [24], we further classify stub networks
based on which tier their providers are in the Internet AS
topology and study the impact of the providers’ locations
on the resilience of the stub networks. We use the
single-provider stub networks to illustrate our findings
because they are vast majority of the stub networks and
most vulnerable to hijacking events. Multi-provider stub
networks are more complicated to characterize because
the providers often belong to different AS tiers (Due to
the space limit, we do not report the results on them
here). Among the 12941 single-provider stubs, 1812 are
customers of Tier-1 ASes, 3876 are customers of Tier-
2 ASes, 4313 are customers of Tier-3 ASes, and the
rest are customers of Tier-4 ASes. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of resilience values for each single-provider
stub group.
We find that the resilience of the single-provider stub
ASes highly depends on where their providers are in the
Internet’s AS hierarchy. The stubs connected to Tier-2
ASes are more resilient than those connected to ASes of
other tiers. Tier-1 ASes are more likely being affected
by a hijacking attack than Tier-2 ASes because the
advertisements for a false route produced by a hijacking
attack will appear as a customer route or a peer route to
the Tier-1 ASes while for Tier-2 ASes such route often
appear to be a provider route. Thus Tier-1 ASes are more
likely to accept such false route advertisements than
Tier-2 ASes. On the other hand, lower-tier ASes (i.e.,
Tier-3 and Tier-4 ASes) tend to have low resilience for
two reasons: (i) they have fewer connections compared
with Tier-2 ASes; (ii) paths reaching them tend to be
longer because they often go through higher-tier ASes.
Since Tier-3 and Tier-4 ASes are similar in resilience
distribution, we group them together as others in the AS
hierarchy from now on.
In summary, our resilience analysis offers two in-

















Fig. 1. The resilience of stub networks

















Fig. 2. The resilience of one-provider stub networks.
sights. (i) The more providers a stub network has, the
more resilient it is. For such a stub network, it is rela-
tively difficult to find effective detection tower locations
but easy to find effective mitigation tower locations. (ii)
Tier-2 ASes are more resilient than other tiers and so are
stub customers of Tier-2 ASes. This makes Tier-2 ASes
be good candidates for providing mitigation services, but
not detection services.
1) Difference from Previous Resilience Study: Al-
though our resilience study shares similar simulation
approaches with [24], there are three major differences.
First, the fundamental goals of the papers are different.
[24] studies via simulation that, for individual AS, what
kind of ASes are more resilient given the unpredictable
hijacking events. Our goal is to select multiple vantage
point ASes to detect and mitigate the hijacking events,
requiring more algorithmic effort. Second, even for the
resilience result, we provide more detailed results, e.g.
we further classify the stub networks based on which tier
their providers are in the Internet AS topology and study
the impact of the providers’ locations on the resilience
of the stub networks. Finally, as shown in Section III-B,
when studying mitigation towers we have to consider the
impact of different sources (polluted ASes), ensuring that
the traffic from multiple sources to the mitigation towers
cannot be hijacked, which is not considered in [24].
B. Detection Results and Analysis
In this section we evaluate the detection effectiveness
of a service provider who would like to offer TOWERDE-
FENSE service to its stub customers. Single-provider
stubs and multi-provider stubs are analyzed separately
because the former’s results are easier to analyze. We
run the detection tower selection algorithm presented in
Section III for each TOWERDEFENSE service provider
(X) and each of its stub customers as the target d.
We compute the average detection effectiveness over
d for each X , which is then averaged over service
providers’ locations in the AS hierarchy (Tier-1, Tier-
2, and Others). In order to trade between number of
detection towers selected and the detection effectiveness,
the selection process is terminated after the gain in the
detection effectiveness by adding a new detection tower
becomes marginal (below 0.5%). Based on our results,

























Fig. 3. Detection effectiveness for single-provider stubs as the number
of detection towers increases.
we further summarize the guidelines about the detection
towers selected by our greedy algorithm.
1) Single-Provider Stubs: Figure 3 shows the average
detection effectiveness in Tier-1, Tier-2, and Others
when increasing the number of detection towers. We
make the following observations. (i) The first selected
detection tower can cover a very high percentage (e.g.
more than 93% in Tier-1) of hijackers. (ii) The gain on
the effectiveness by adding additional detection towers
becomes marginal after 4 detection towers are selected.
(iii) None of the Tier-1 ASes is selected as the detection
tower by any of the service providers. (iv) Tier-1 service
providers achieve highest detection effectiveness (e.g.
up to 99.8%) while Tier-2 service providers achieve
the lowest. The third observation is consistent with our
expectation based on the resilience-based analysis at the
end of Section IV-A. Detailed analysis of the first two
observations are provided below.
Which AS is selected as the first detection tower? Our
greedy algorithm chooses the AS with the best detection
effectiveness as the first detection tower. We use real
examples from our simulation traces to illustrate the
insights behind such selections in Figure 4. In Figure 4,
there are three examples, one for a TOWERDEFENSE ser-
vice provider at each tier: AS7018 for Tier-1, AS13249
for Tier-2, and AS2854 for Tier-3. The shaded node is
the first detection tower selected by the greedy algorithm.
d is one representative single-provider stub customer AS
of the service provider X (the detection effectiveness
of any other single-provider stub customer ASes of the
same provider X is the same as that of d).
In Figure 4(a), AS3261 (a small ISP with some
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Fig. 4. Examples from simulation traces to explain tower selection for single-provider stub target d with provider at different locations (shown
in the subfigure captions).
customers but only one provider AS35320) is chosen
as the first detection tower for TOWERDEFENSE service
provider Tier-1 AS7018. AS3261 can observe more than
96.1% of hijacking events targeted at d. This is mainly
because its sole provider AS35320 (a Tier-2 AS) can be
easily impacted by the hijacking event of target d, and
then propagates the polluted path to AS3261. In addition,
AS3261 can observe some other hijacking events if
the attacker is a customer of AS3261, which AS35320
cannot observe.
Let us explain why AS35320 can be easily pol-
luted now. AS35320 has two Tier-1 providers AS15097
and AS7459. It also peers with many (45) large Tier-
1/Tier-2 ASes. Originally, AS35320 will choose the
route AS35320 - AS7459 (or AS15097) - AS7018 to
destination d. This original route is a provider route,
which is less preferred than a peer route or a customer
route, according to the BGP best path selection process.
Therefore, AS35320 will be polluted if (i) the hijacker is
Tier-1 provider of AS35320 (e.g. h1 in Figure 4) because
the route AS35320-h1 is shorter than the original route
to d; (ii) the hijacker is in its Tier-2 peers (e.g. h2 in
Figure 4) because it prefers a peer route than a provider
route; or (iii) the hijacker is in a lower-tier ASes (e.g.
h3 in Figure 4) and the fake announcement reaches any
of AS35320’s peer/customer ASes.
In Tier-2 and Tier-3 cases shown in Figures 4 (b) and
(c), AS3307 and AS3557 were first selected as the detec-
tion tower, respectively. They share two commonalities.
First, the selected ASes will receive the provider route
from the destination AS. Second, the selected ASes are
either the Tier-2 ASes, or poorly connected to (with one
or two connections) Tier-2 ASes.These commonalities
are also observed on other detection towers selected by
our algorithm.
Which ASes are selected after the first detection
tower? Figure 3 shows that the second tower selected
offers good improvement of detection effectiveness than
towers selected later, especially for Tier-1 and Tier-2
cases. We now investigate the similarity between the
towers selected first and second by our algorithm. We
Fig. 5. Locally polluted example
define the term Tier-2 peering set of the tower, given
the key role of Tier-2 ASes in detection effectiveness.
If a Tier-2 AS is selected, then the Tier-2 peering set
is the set of the ASes peering with this Tier-2 AS.
Otherwise, the Tier-2 peering set is the set of ASes
peering with the AS’ Tier-2 provider(s)6. We compute
the Jaccard coefficient7 of Tier-2 peering sets of the
first two selected towers to compute their similarity. The
Jaccard coefficient for the first two selected towers on
average is 0.18, with maximum 0.27; while the overall
Jaccard coefficient for any two Tier-2 ASes on average
is 0.46. This result indicates that the first two selected
towers have significant different peering sets. In other
words, they are diverse from each other.
Why does the coverage gain become marginal after
a few detection towers? We noted that the coverage
become stable after selecting first few detection towers.
The reason is that some hijacking cases are difficult
to detect, making it difficult to achieve 100% overall
detection effectiveness, thus there is not much room
for coverage increase from the already-high coverage
provided by the first few selected towers. We investigated
those hard-to-cover hijacking cases, and found that, gen-
erally speaking, these are locally polluted cases, where
only several stub nodes are polluted by the hijackings.
Figure 5 shows a real example of locally polluted
6This definition does not apply on Tier-1 AS since no Tier-1 AS
was selected by our algorithm.
7The Jaccard coefficient measures similarity between sample sets,
and is defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the
union of the sample sets.
case. Hijacker AS15227, which has only one provider
AS7018, advertises the prefix p belonging to the target
stub AS d. AS7018 then has two equally good routes,
both from customers and with the same path length
of 1. Therefore, AS7018 has a 50% chance to select
either path. In case it sticks to the original path learned
from d, it will not propagate the fake announcement to
other ASes. Therefore, only AS15227’s direct or indirect
customer ASes (the four gray nodes in the figure) are
impacted in this case, and unless we have detection tower
in these ASes, this hijacking will not be not detected.
2) Multi-Provider Stubs: Figures 6 (a), (b), and (c)
show the detection effectivenesss for multi-provider stub
customers of Tier-1, Tier-2, and Others, respectively. 8
We group multi-provider stub customers into three differ-
ent groups based on the number of their providers. Then
we compute the average effectiveness in each group
varying the number of detection towers. We have the
following observations. (i) The first few selected detec-
tion towers can cover a very high percentage of hijacking
cases, and the effectiveness gain becomes marginal after
more than 8 detection towers are selected. (ii) The more
providers a stub customer has, the more detection towers
are needed to achieve good detection effectiveness. (iii)
The first detection tower is almost always a Tier-2 AS
or its immediate customers which has only one or two
providers. The second tower is also very diverse from
the first tower. These observations are similar to those
on the single-provider stubs.
How does the number of providers’ impact the
detection effectiveness? We can clearly see that the
more providers a stub customer has, the more detection
towers are needed. For example, as shown in Figure 6(b)
the detection effectiveness for stub ASes with more than
3 providers appears to be only slightly over 80% though
those for majority of stub customers range from 90%
to 99%. To explain this, we define that for a given
target stub customer d and a hijacker AS h, the impact
of the hijacking event as the number of polluted ASes
divided by the total number of ASes. We use the stub
customers of AS7018 (a Tier-1 AS) as a case study to
illustrate our findings. Figure 7 shows the average impact
of a hijacker on the stub customers of a given number
of providers. The hijackers on x axis are ranked in
decreasing order of their average impact. We observe that
(i) different hijacker ASes have different impacts on the
same set of stub customers, and (ii) the more providers
a stub customer has, the smaller impact a hijacker has,
and hence the harder to detect with a small number of
detection towers. These observation also suggest that it
is more important to detect the hijacking events of bigger
8Note that a customer can be multi-homed to a Tier-1 AS and a
Tier-2 AS, thus it will be considered in both Figure 6 (a) and (b).






















Fig. 7. The average impact of different hijacker ASes on stub
customers of AS7018
impact than those with smaller impact. We normalize the
detection effectiveness by the impact of hijacking events
and find that the normalized detection effectiveness is
always higher than 94% if using 8 detection towers.
These numbers are much higher than those shown in
Figure 6 specially for non-tier-1 multi-provider stub
customers (please refer to [33] for details).
How does a multi-provider stub select the TOW-
ERDEFENSE provider? For a multi-provider stub cus-
tomer d, if two or more of its providers provide TOW-
ERDEFENSE service, which provider should d choose?
The answer is that d can choose any of its providers.
The detection effectivenesss of using different providers
for d are very similar because the detection towers are
selected based on the same set of information (e.g., AS
topology). Please refer to [33] for detailed discussion.
3) Detection Tower Selection Strategies: Based on
our analysis results, we summarize the strategies on
selecting detection towers for a given service provider
X and a given target d. These guidelines help service
providers not only understand the usefulness of existing
vantage points, but also determine adding new vantage
points. When the service provider has no complete AS
topology or simply do not want to run our selection
aglorithm, it can still choose the vantage points based
on local topology information of the candidate vantage
points according to the following strategeis.
1) Select v that has multiple providers and is con-
nected to many peers such that v uses a provider
or a peer route to reach as many targets as pos-
sible, making it easier to be polluted by the fake
routes from peers or customers, respectively. Some
(not all) well-connected tier-2 nodes satisfy this
requirement.
2) Select v which is relatively far away from d so
that AS path to d is more likely to be polluted by
a shorter fake route.
3) Select the immediate poorly connected (e.g. single-
provider) customer of v as the alternative.
4) Select v that is diverse from existing detection
towers. For example, one should avoid selecting v
in an AS which is directly connected to an already
selected detection towers.


























(a) Stub is Tier-1’s customer

























(b) Stub is Tier-2’s customer


























(c) Stub is Others’ customer
Fig. 6. The detection effectiveness of multi-provider stub customers of Tier-1, Tier-2, and Others ASes

























Fig. 8. single-provider, reflector case.


























Fig. 9. single-provider, mirror case.





















The number of reflectors/mirrors
m−tier−1 m−ier−2 m−others r−tier−1 r−tier−2 r−others
Fig. 10. Multi-provider, reflectors and mir-
rors.
C. Mitigation Results and Analysis
We now evaluate the algorithm described in section
III.
1) Selection Results: Figures 8 and 9 show average
mitigation effectiveness for single-provider stubs and
Figure 10 shows those for multi-provider stubs. As
expected, for both reflectors and mirrors, stub customers
of Tier-2 ASes can be better mitigated (e.g. up to 98.2%
in Figure 10) than stub customers of other tier ASes with
the same number of mitigation towers. Mirror mitigation
is always better than reflector mitigation because a
successful mirror does not require the path from itself to
the target d not to be polluted by hijacking events on d,
but a successful reflector does.
To further illustrate the mitigation effectiveness dif-
ference between mirrors and reflectors, Figure 11 shows
the mitigation effectiveness for single-provider stubs
which are customers of Tier-1 ISPs when using n(n =
2, 4, 6) mitigation points consisting of m mirrors (m =
0, 1, ...n) and n−m reflectors. We find that for all cases,
the mitigation effectiveness increases as the number of
mirrors increases. In addition, the curves tare close to
each other when the same number of mirrors are used.
This observation seems to suggest that the dominant mit-
igation effectiveness are contributed by mirrors in these
mixed compositions. In other words adding reflectors to
a mirror mitigation system has limited marginal benefit.
If the mitigation effectiveness is the only factor that
is considered in the tower selection process, then our
results suggest that mirrors should be used instead of
reflector. However in reality there are other factors
limiting the use of mirrors. First, it is more expensive
to deploy a mirror than to deploy a reflector due to the

























6 towers (2  mirrors + 4 reflectors)
4 towers (3  mirrors +  1 reflector)
Fig. 11. Combining mirrors and reflectors. Single-home & tier-1
case.
extra system and network resources a mirror requires to
serve customers directly from itself. Second, there are
certainly more overhead on realtime synchronization of
contents and meta-data. All these factors can be easily
integrated into the mitigation selection algorithm so that
an optimum combination of mirrors and reflectors can
be determined to achieve the desire tradeoff between the
cost and mitigation effectiveness.
In our analysis, we also find that multi-provider stubs
can be better mitigated than single-provider stubs. In
both cases, there are several commonalities among the
top choice mitigation points. Figure 12 illustrates three
cases for using reflectors in mitigating single-provider
stub d connected to ASes of different tiers. The top
choice reflectors are the lightly shaded ASes. The most
noticeable commonality among the reflectors is that
they are all Tier-2 ASes with many Tier-1 and Tier-2
neighbors. This is also common to all top choice mirror
locations as well. The other two commonalities among
these reflectors are that (i) they are relatively close (e.g.,
one or two hops away) to the target d, and (ii) the
path between the reflector and d contains, in decreasing
1 3 2 4 9
d
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Fig. 12. The examples of reflector selection
preference order, provider, peer, and customer links.
2) Mitigation Selection Strategies: Based on our re-
sults, we suggest two general strategies for selecting
reflectors and mirrors.
1) Find the reflector r which has smallest chance to
be polluted by a hijacking event on the target stub
customer d. This is complimentary to the detection
selection. It is preferable to select a reflector r
(i) of which the origin route from d to r is a
customer route than a peer route than a provider
route; (ii) which is close to d; (iii) which covers
as few number of potential hijacker routes learned
from providers and peers as possible. Note that this
strategy applies only to reflector selection and is
not needed for mirror selection.
2) Find the reflector r which will not be easily
hijacked (i.e. r is resilient). To achieve the high
resilience of r, one need to select a r which reaches
as many Tier-1 ASes and other large ISPs as pos-
sible via customer routes. In addition, the route to
from r to each of these Tier-1 ASes and large ISPs
should be short. The similar suggestion regarding
resilience is also discussed in [24]. This strategy
applies to both reflector and mirror selection.
D. Impact of Incomplete AS topology
As we mentioned in Section IV-A, the AS topology
is incomplete, and it may lead to overestimation or
underestimation of hijacking events. We now evaluate the
robustness of our tower selection algorithms. According
to previous study [34], many peer links between lower
tiers’ ASes can be missing in the inferred AS topology
based on public BGP data. We assume that there are x%
of peer links between Tier-3/Tier-4 ASes (i.e. others)
are missing and the missing peer links are randomly
distributed. To reconstruct the “complete” AS topology,
we randomly select n/(1 − x%) pairs of Tier-3/Tier-4
ASes, the two ASes in each of which are not neighbors,
where n is the number of inferred peer links in the
AS topology. We then add a peer link between ASes
in each selected AS pair to the AS topology. We select
the towers based on incomplete topology and evaluate
the accuracy by simulating the hijack events based on the
“complete” topology. Table I shows the average detection
and mitigation effectiveness, when the number of towers
are fixed as 6. We observe that the effectiveness decease
when increasing x. It is because the larger x is, the larger
the differences are between the topology used to select
the towers and the complete topology. We also find that
even missing half of peering links, the algorithm has
relative high (more than 86%) coverage, indicating that
our algorithm is robust to the missing links.
E. Impact of Route Diversity
In our evaluation, we mainly assume that (1) the
hijacker will pollute all its neighbors to maximize the
impact. (2) when one router in the AS is polluted, then
all routers in this AS will be polluted. In reality, the
hijacker may select some of neighbors to propagate the
fake AS path announcement. Moreover, it is possible that
some of routers in the AS will be polluted, especially
when the AS is large e.g. tier-1 or tier-2 ASes. As a
result, different routers within one AS may have different
views of routes. Figure 13 shows an example. Assume
that AS T is the owner of prefix p. Hijacker AS H
announces itself as the prefix owner, and propagate the
announcement through edge router H2. Routers B1, B2
and C1 are polluted. C2 is not because both one hop
from C to H and T , C1 will prefer the routes learned
from e-BGP session of T . As a result, AS A is not
polluted, AS B is fully polluted, and AS C is partially
polluted.
In order to evaluate the impact of these route diversity
cases on our tower selection algorithm, we conduct the
following simulation. We split hijacker AS and each tier-
1/tier-2 ASes into two sub-ASes (like in Figure 13).
These two parts have equal number of neighbor ASes.
The overlap ratio of neighbors is y. Due to the difference
of neighbor AS, these two sub ASes may have different
view of AS updates. Under this condition, tower selec-
tion is more restricted: In order to cover the hijacking
events, the detection tower should be in the AS whose
both sub-ASes are polluted, e.g. AS B in Figure 13. In














Fig. 13. The examples of route diversity.
should be in the AS whose neither of two sub-ASes are
polluted, e.g. AS A in Figure 13.
To evaluate the impact of partial propagation, we com-
pare the detection/mitigation effectiveness of the towers
selected by original simulation environment (APX) and
the new one (OPT), under the new and more “real”
propagation cases. We fix the number of towers as 6
and tune the parameter y. Table II shows the results.
The small value of y means the higher diversity of route
views, which means that selection of detection tower and
mitigation tower are more restricted, making it harder to
to select the towers. We find that the smaller y is, the
the smaller the detection/mitigation effectiveness is. We
also find that the effectiveness of APX is slightly lower
than OPT when y = 0.1 and y = 0.9. When y = 1.0, the
effectivenesses are the same because two sub-ASes have
identical view. Given that we have no idea that the real
partial propagation looks like, we will still use original
methodology.
F. Case Study: How Large ISPs May Improve Protection
Effectiveness
We now use a case study to illustrate the value that
the TOWERDEFENSE system may offer to large ISPs.
A large ISP often has multiple ASes. Thus it is
tempting for such an ISP to simply deploy detection and
mitigation points at its own ASes for protecting the ISP’s
customers. Such a deployment strategy may also seem
effective because such ISPs networks often span across
large geographic areas or even multiple continents. Our
case study is about a large Tier-1 ISP. Despite the fact
that this ISP has 20 ASes of its own, Figure 14 shows
that the detection and mitigation effectiveness (averaging
over all of its direct stub customers) are very low when
only the ISP’s own 20 ASes are used, with no additional
towers(i.e., 0 on X-axis).
We first investigate how our tower selection algorithms
can help improve this Tier-1 ISP’s deployment strategy.
First, when we start from scratch, 3 ASes9 are enough
to achieve the same effectiveness as using all 20 existing
ASes can achieve. Second, in addition to using self-
owned ASes, external ASes can be identified to help
9The selected detection, reflector, and mirror towers can be different.
Hence more than one ASes might be needed.
improve protection quality quickly. Figure 14 shows how
protection quality significantly increases as the number
of external ASes are used for deploying detection and
mitigation towers.
Next, we use the same Tier-1 ISP as an example to
show that TOWERDEFENSE service can be incrementally
deployed. Based on the public topology data as of
June 2009, in total this AS has 823 stub customers,
including 390 single-provider customers and 433 multi-
provider stub customers. Initially we randomly select
one customer and we pretend this is the first customer
signing up for prefix hijacking protection service. We
deploy 6 towers using the methods as described before.
Next, we randomly choose another customer and pretend
that this is a new customer signing up for the service.
It may or may not be necessary to add new tower or
towers to maintain the overall protection effectiveness
to be not lower than its current vale. Figure 15 shows
how the number of towers increases as more and more
customers sign up for the service. The gradual slopes
of lines indicate that such service can be incrementally
deployed as the number of customers increases. Even
when a majority of its customers (800 out of 1266) have
signed up one by one for the TOWERDEFENSE service,
at most 20 towers (9 for detection, 11 for either mirror
or reflector) are needed, as shown in the figure when the
value on x-axis is 800.
The above case study shows that TOWERDEFENSE
is very deployable from individual provider point of
view. Assuming that TOWERDEFENSE can be deployed
by many providers, we now investigate what kind of
providers have more incentive to build offer such service
(i.e., they are more cost-effective in terms of achieving a
certain level of detection/mitigation effectiveness when
new stub customers are subscribed to the service). In the
evaluation, we randomly select some ISPs in different
tiers (5 from Tier-1, 10 from Tier-2 and 20 from Tier-
3). For each chosen provider, similarly to the previous
case study, we start with 6 towers at the beginning.
When new stub customers start to register the service, the
provider have to keep adding new towers to maintain the
originally effectiveness. To satisfy all stub customers, we
compute the number of towers needed out of providers’
ASes. We use the customer per tower ratio as the
metric to measure the cost-effectiveness of deploying
TOWERDEFENSE. We find that the average ratios are
36.4, 15.2, and 2.5 for Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3 ISPs,
respectively. The results indicate that the Tier-1 providers
are most cost-effective and hence have more incentive to
deploy and provide TOWERDEFENSE service.
V. INTERNET EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate TOWERDEFENSE performance by con-
structing synthetic hijacking attacks using Internet mea-
TABLE I
ROBUSTNESS OF TOWER SELECTION, FACING INCOMPLETE
TOPOLOGY
x 0 10 20 30 40 50
Detection tower .902 .895 .891 .883 .875 .867
Mirror .953 .950 .941 .933 .929 .920
Reflector .923 .918 .914 .908 .903 .891
TABLE II
ROBUSTNESS OF TOWER SELECTION, FACING ROUTE DIVERSITY
y 0.1 0.9 1.0
APX OPT APX OPT APX OPT
Detection tower .822 .853 .848 .863 .902 .902
Mirror .906 .927 .932 .944 .953 .953
Reflector .882 .902 .903 .914 .923 .923



















Fig. 14. Effectiveness vs. # of extra towers.

























Fig. 15. The incremental deployment.
surements on Planetlab [35].
A. Experimental Methodology
We conduct our experiments in the following steps.
First, we identify a set of target prefixes used in the
experiments. Then, we select candidate Planetlab nodes
to serve as the base of our experimental infrastructure.
Each node can serve as detection tower, mitigation tower,
traffic source, or hijacker in various attack scenarios.
Next, for each target prefix, we select detection towers
and mitigation towers among candidate Planetlab nodes
using TOWERDEFENSE methodology. As a comparison,
we also implemented monitor selection schemes studied
in [36]: (1) random based: monitor nodes are selected
randomly and (2) greedy link based: at any time, the
next detection tower is selected with the largest number
of unobserved links, given the set of already detection
selected towers. Oppositely, the next mitigation tower
is selected with the largest number of observed links,
given the set of already selected mitigation towers.
Finally, we construct all possible attack scenarios among
candidate Planetlab nodes and evaluate the performance
of TOWERDEFENSE.
Protected Target Selection. We select target prefixes
from four different groups: (i) Multiple Origin ASes
(MOAS) prefixes, (ii) Single Origin AS (SOAS) prefixes
with large traffic volume, (iii) prefixes of popular Web
sites, and (vi) prefixes of popular online social networks.
Combining prefixes from four groups, we have a total
of 343 target prefixes. We manually identify the service
provider of these target prefixes. 57 of them are served by
CDN providers, while the rest are served by ISPs. For
each of the 201 target prefix with multiple providers,
we randomly select one as the service provider which
provides defense service to the prefix using TOWERDE-
FENSE. More details of target selection can be found
in [33].
Planetlab Nodes Selection. We manually select 73 Plan-
etlab nodes in 36 distinct ASes at different geographical
regions. More specifically, relying on the DNS name, we
select half of US nodes, which covers both coasts and the
middle area; and half from other countries, which cover
different continents. These 73 Planetlab nodes serve as
the base for our experiments, i.e., potential hijackers,
traffic sources, and detection/mitigation towers are se-
lected from these nodes. The reasons of not selecting all
Planetlab nodes are: (1) some nodes are co-located (e.g.
multiple nodes in one university campus). They do not
provide much gain in using TOWERDEFENSE; (2) some
nodes are unstable or heavily loaded. We exclude them
from our experiments.
Measurement Data Gathering. In our experiments,
each selected Planetlab node measures its paths to all live
IP addresses in all selected target prefixes via traceroute.
In addition, each Planetlab node also measures its paths
to other Planetlab nodes. We obtain AS-level paths
of above measured paths by mapping IP addresses to
their ASes based on the IP-to-AS mapping published at
iPlane [37].
Constructing Synthetic Prefix Hijacking Events. As-
suming that “prefer customer routes” and “valley-free
routing” are used as interdomain routing policies, we
use the same method as in Section III for determining
whether an AS is impacted by the hijacking event. For
a target prefix d, we first select detection towers and
mitigation towers from the 73 Planetlab nodes using
greedy algorithms described in Section III. The selection
process is based on the assumption that the traffic source
and hijacker can be potentially anywhere on the Internet.
We now construct synthetic prefix hijacking events
on the Planetlab nodes. In particular, we first select one
Planetlab node as the source s, another Planetlab node
as the hijacker h, which attempts to hijack the target
prefix d. Then we construct attack scenario using the
TABLE III
EFFECTIVENESS OF TOWERDEFENSE OVER PROTECTED TARGETS.
TowerDefense Ramdon Greedy-link
AVG STD AVG STD AVG STD
Detection tower .943 .013 .632 .104 .842 .062
Reflector .816 .023 .432 .203 .719 .107
Mirror .846 .022 .443 .228 .684 .127
same methods described in [20].
We repeat experiments for all possible selections of h,
s, and d, except for cases where d’s AS is on the AS path
from s to h because the hijack will never succeed in these
cases. In addition, since some paths were not traceroute-
able, we had to discard combinations that require these
paths.
B. Detection Tower Selection Effectiveness
We use the detection method proposed in [20], which
uses hop count and path divergence information obtained
from the data plane. In addition, we use a fixed number
of detection towers (i.e., 6)10 in the Planetlab experi-
ments and compute the average detection effectiveness
for each target prefix.
Table III compares the effectiveness of detection tower
selection using TOWERDEFENSE algorithm, random and
greedy-link based algorithm [36]. We observe that our
algorithm yields the highest detection effectiveness.
Greedy-link algorithm is better than Random algorithm,
but not as good as our algorithm because its optimization
goal is to maximize link visibility of AS topology, rather
than hijacking probability.
Though we use the detection method proposed in
[20] in our experiments, TOWERDEFENSE can adopt any
of the existing detection methods [2], [15]–[20], [31].
The only exception is iSpy [22]. iSpy is a data plane
prefix hijacking detection method that is designed to
be used by the target prefix itself. Another important
difference between TOWERDEFENSE and iSpy is that
TOWERDEFENSE carefully chooses a small number of
detection towers and probes from the detection towers
to the target prefix, while iSpy probes from the target
prefix to every transit AS on the Internet. Figure ??
compares the effectiveness of TOWERDEFENSE and iSpy
with varying probing costs under default settings. We
observe that when the number of probe paths is small,
TOWERDEFENSE can achieve much higher detection
ratio (the percentage of detected hijacking events) than
iSpy. For example, TOWERDEFENSE can achieve over
90% detection ratio by using 5 detection towers, while
iSpy can achieve about 50% detection ratio if 5 random
transit ASes are probed. Both methods benefit from
adding more detection towers or probing more transit
10Gains of adding additional towers become marginal, similar to
simulation in Section IV.
ASes. When all 73 Planetlab nodes are used as detection
towers, TOWERDEFENSE can achieve 99.87% detection
ratio. The corresponding figure for iSpy is about 90%
when 73 transit ASes are probed. On the other hand,
we also observe that iSpy can achieve 99.54% detection
ratio when all (thousands of) transit ASes are probed.
This implies that TOWERDEFENSE is much more cost
effective than iSpy, though both methods can achieve
comparable detection ratio when probing cost is not a
concern.
C. Mitigation Tower Selection Effectiveness
Recall that TOWERDEFENSE uses two types of mitiga-
tion towers: reflectors and mirrors. We use three metrics
in evaluating the effectiveness of the mitigation tower
selection: (i) mitigation effectiveness; (ii) reduction in
the impact of hijacking event; and (iii) change in AS
path lengths for impacted traffic.
Mitigation Effectiveness. For each target prefix, we
select a fixed number of mitigation towers (i.e., 6) among
candidate Planetlab nodes and compute the mitigation
effectiveness for each possible attack scenario. Table III
compares average mitigation effectiveness achieved by
both mirrors and reflectors selected using TOWERDE-
FENSEalgorithm described in Section III with random
and greedy-link algorithms. Similar to detection results,
we observe that our algorithm is the best, because our
algorithm is tailored to optimizing the mitigation effec-
tiveness. More specifically, we observe that the average
mitigation effectiveness is about 80% with 6 carefully
selected reflectors (Note that the ratio is lower than that
in Section IV because we have very limited number of
candidate selections in Planetlab). The average mitiga-
tion effectiveness is close to 90% with 6 mirrors.
Hijacking Impact Reduction. We measure the impact
of a hijacking event by the percentage of ASes from
which the path to the target prefix is polluted by the
hijacker. We compare the impact of a hijacking event
before and after using mitigation towers. Figure 17
shows the hijacking impact reduction when 6 mitigation
towers are used in TOWERDEFENSE. We observe that
the use of reflectors or mirrors significantly reduced the
impact of hijacking events (e.g., from 65% ∼ 90% to
10% ∼ 15%). Again, the reduction of hijacking impact
by using mirrors is more significant than that of using
reflectors.
Changes in AS Path Lengths. In TOWERDEFENSE,
the impacted traffic is re-routed to or through mitigation
towers. We compare the AS path lengths of the impacted
traffic before and after using mitigation towers for each
target prefix. Figure 18 shows that the average AS path
lengths increases 1.7 AS hops and 0.6 AS hops when
reflectors or mirrors are used, respectively. Note that a























Fig. 16. The effectiveness of detection tower
selection, compared with iSpy

















Fig. 17. Hijacking impact reduction using
mitigation towers.
























Fig. 18. The change of AS path lengths using
mitigation towers
negative value means a decrease in AS path lengths.
This is observed for some target prefixes when mirrors
are used, when some mirrors are placed in the upstream
providers of the target prefix.
VI. RELATED WORK
A number of solutions have been proposed to proac-
tively defend against prefix hijacking [2]–[14], but the
placement and deployment problems are not the focuses
of these work. These approaches also need to change
router software, router configurations, network opera-
tions, or introduce public key infrastructures, and most of
them also need explicit collaboration with others, which
make immediate deployment very difficult. For example,
in the mitigation approach in [14], victim AS needs to
collaborate with its previous-arranged “Lifesaver” ASes
to remove the bogus route and promote the genuine
route.
The hijacking detection approaches [15]–[20], [31]
use control-plane and/or data-plane vantage points to
detect hijacking. However, most of them depends on
existing routing information tapping points (e.g. Route
Views [28] and RIPE [29] or regulated traffic access(e.g.
PlanetLab [35]), which are often not optimum for hijack-
ing detection.
Instead of using vantage points, iSpy [22] allows
a prefix owner to detect hijacking attacks on its own
prefix by probing a large number of transit ASes on the
Internet. As shown in Section V-B, iSpy requires much
more probing overhead than TOWERDEFENSE and only
works for a specific type of hijacking attacks known as
“blackholing”.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the practical deployment
strategies for battling against IP prefix hijacking, which
we call TOWERDEFENSE . We advocate that the best
way to move forward prefix hijacking protection is to
offer such a protection as a new type of service by
existing service providers, and propose a simple heuristic
for the placing detection and mitigation agents. Through
extensive simulations and large scale experiments, we
show that with a small number of detection and mit-
igation agents deployed at locations selected by our
selection algorithms, TOWERDEFENSE can achieve high
detection and mitigation success ratios. Our case study
of one Tier-1 ISP as TOWERDEFENSE provider also
shows that high success ratios can also be achieved
when detection and mitigation points are incrementally
deployed.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Rekhter, T. Li, and S. Hares, “Border Gateway Protocol 4,” Internet
Engineering Task Force, RFC 4271, Jan. 2006.
[2] L. Subramanian, V. Roth, I. Stoica, S. Shenker, and R. H. Katz, “Listen and
Whisper: Security Mechanisms for BGP,” in Proc. USENIX NSDI, Mar.
2004.
[3] W. Aiello, J. Ioannidis, and P. McDaniel, “Origin Authentication in
Interdomain Routing,” in Proc. of ACM CCS, Oct. 2003.
[4] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and M. Sirbu, “SPV: Secure Path Vector Routing for
Securing BGP,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2004.
[5] J. Ng, “Extensions to BGP to Support Secure Origin BGP,” April 2004,
ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/sobgp/drafts/draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions-02.txt.
[6] S. Kent, C. Lynn, and K. Seo, “Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP),”
IEEE JSAC Special Issue on Network Security, Apr. 2000.
[7] K. Butler, P. McDaniel, and W. Aiello, “Optimizing BGP Security by
Exploiting Path Stability,” in Proc. ACM CCS, Nov. 2006.
[8] B. R. Smith and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves, “Securing the Border Gateway
Routing Protocol,” in Proc. Global Internet, Nov. 1996.
[9] G. Goodell, W. Aiello, T. Griffin, J. Ioannidis, P. McDaniel, and A. Rubin,
“Working Around BGP: An Incremental Approach to Improving Security
and Accuracy of Interdomain Routing,” in Proc. NDSS, Feb. 2003.
[10] L. Wang, X. Zhao, D. Pei, R. Bush, D. Massey, A. Mankin, S. Wu, and
L. Zhang, “Protecting BGP Routes to Top Level DNS Servers,” in Proc.
IEEE ICDCS, 2003.
[11] X. Zhao, D. Pei, L. Wang, D. Massey, A. Mankin, S. Wu, and L. Zhang,
“Dection of Invalid Routing Announcement in the Internet,” in Proc.
IEEE/IFIP DSN, June 2002.
[12] J. Karlin, S. Forrest, and J. Rexford, “Pretty Good BGP: Protecting BGP
by Cautiously Selecting Routes,” in Proc. IEEE ICNP, Nov. 2006.
[13] S. Y. Qiu, F. Monrose, A. Terzis, and P. D. McDaniel, “Efficient Techniques
for Detecting False Origin Advertisements in Inter-domain Routing,” in
Proc. IEEE NPsec, Nov. 2006.
[14] Z. Zhang, Y. Zhang, Y. C. Hu, and Z. M. Mao, “Practical Defenses Against
BGP Prefix Hijacking,” in Proc. ACM CoNext, Dec. 2007.
[15] C. Kruegel, D. Mutz, W. Robertson, and F. Valeur, “Topology-based
Detection of Anomalous BGP Messages,” in Proc. RAID, Sept. 2003.
[16] “RIPE myASn System,” http://www.ris.ripe.net/myasn.html.
[17] M. Lad, D. Massey, D. Pei, Y. Wu, B. Zhang, and L. Zhang, “PHAS: A
Prefix Hijack Alert System,” in Proc. USENIX Security Symposium, Aug.
2006.
[18] X. Hu and Z. M. Mao, “Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Prefix
Hijacking,” in Proc. IEEE Security and Privacy, May 2007.
[19] G. Siganos and M. Faloutsos, “Neighborhood Watch for Internet Routing:
Can We Improve the Robustness of Internet Routing Today?” in Proc.
IEEE INFOCOM, May 2007.
[20] C. Zheng, L. Ji, D. Pei, J. Wang, and P. Francis, “A Light-Weight
Distributed Scheme for Detecting IP Prefix Hijacks in Real-Time,” in Proc.
ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2007.
[21] T. Qiu, L. Ji, D. Pei, J. Wang, J. Xu, and H. Ballani, “Locating Prefix
Hijackers using LOCK,” in Proc. USENIX Security Symposium, Aug. 2009.
[22] Z. Zhang, Y. Zhang, Y. C. Hu, Z. M. Mao, and R. Bush, “Ispy: Detecting
IP Prefix Hijacking on My Own,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2008.
[23] Y. Zhang, Z. Zhang, Z. M. Mao, and Y. C. Hu, “HC-BGP: A Light-weight
and Flexible Scheme for Securing Prefix Ownership,” in Proc. DSN-DCCS,
2009.
[24] M. Lad, R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, and L. Zhang, “Understanding Resiliency
of Internet Topology Against Prefix Hijack Attacks,” in Proc. IEEE/IFIP
DSN, June 2007.
[25] “Tower defense,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tower defense.
[26] V. Cardellini, M. Colajanni, and P. S. Yu, “Redirection algorithms for load
sharing in distributed web-server systems,” in Proc. IEEE ICDCS, May.
1999.
[27] A. Shaikh, R. Tewari, and M. Agrawal, “On the Effectiveness of DNS-
based Server Selection,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2001.
[28] “University of Oregon Route Views Archive Project,” http://www.
routeview.org.
[29] “RIPE RIS Raw Data,” http://www.ripe.net/projects/ris/rawdata.html.
[30] L. Gao, “On Inferring Autonomous System Relationships in the Internet,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2001.
[31] H. Ballani, P. Francis, and X. Zhang, “A Study of Prefix Hijacking and
Interception in the Internet,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2007.
[32] L. Subramanian, S. Agarwal, J. Rexford, and R. H. Katz, “Characterizing
the Internet Hierarchy from Multiple Vantage Points,” in Proc. IEEE
INFOCOM, Apr. 2002.
[33] T. Qiu, L. Ji, D. Pei, J. Wang, and J. Xu, “TowerDefense: Battling Against
Prex Hijacking as a Service,” Georgia Institute of Technology, Tech. Rep.
GT-CS-09-08., May 2009.
[34] R. Oliveira, D. Pei, W. Willinger, B. Zhang, and L. Zhang, “The
(in)Completeness of the Observed Internet AS-level Structuree,” in
IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 2010.
[35] “PlanetLab,” http://www.planet-lab.org.
[36] Y. Zhang, Z. Zhang, Z. M. Mao, Y. C. Hu, , and B. Maggs, “On the Impact
of Route Monitor Selection,” in Proc. ACM IMC, 2007.
[37] “iPlane,” http://iplane.cs.washington.edu/.
